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AM GLAD to have this opportunity to speak to
Mississippi bankers about some vital issues relating to
inflation and price stabilization, The numerous pro-
posals advanced in the past year to stabilize prices
indicate the wide concern of this nation for the infla-
tion problem. Some persons view the continuing rise
in prices and the large wage increases negotiated in
some sectors as evidence that monetary and fiscal
actions have been ineffective. -They suggest that other
measures must be applied to stem the tide of rising
wages and prices. Such proposals include Govern-
mental admonishment, wage and price guidelines, and
mandatory wage, price, and credit controls.
The Committeefor Economic Development (CED),
a proponent of voluntary wage and price controls, in
a recent discussion of measures for controlling infla-
tion stated, “. ..while appropriately stabilizing fis-
cal and monetary policies are clearly essential for
the containment of inflation, it seems doubtful that
these policies alone can fully succeed in reconciling
price stability and high employment.” The CED
further stated, “. ..that the United States should
include voluntary wage-price policies among its tools
for reconciling price stability and high employment.”2
I find, however, that in May 1946, near the end of
that period of mandatory controls, the CED issued a
statement which represents a different view. At that
time it concluded, “. ..prices cannot be centrally
controlled for any sustained period without ineffi-
ciency, inequity, breakdown of respect for law, and
most important, serious danger to our personal and
political freedoms.” “Tue government has a respon-
sibility to supplement and supplant price control by
‘Committee for Economic Development, Research and Policy
Committee, Further Weapons Against Inflation Measures
to Supplement General Fiscal and Monetary Policies (New
York, November 1970), p. 12.
2Thjd., p. 22.
3
Committee for Economic Development, Research Committee,
The End of Price Control — How and WhenP (New York,
May 1946), p. 4.
anti-inflation measures which do not restrict the full
and free operation of the American productive system.
In the traditional governmental functions of taxation,
public expenditure, and monetary control we can find
the necessary tools.”4
I prefer the Committee’s 1946 statement made
while experiencing the impact of direct government
controls on wages and prices. It then recognized that
the mandatory controls interfered with the profit in-
centive and led to a breakdown of respect for law.
I see no reason why voluntary controls will engender
greater respect for law or governmental authority than
mandatory controls.
It is my view that the general stabilization measures
will work if applied with patience. Neither official
admonishments, voluntary controls, nor direct con-
trols are workable; they are useless as substitutes for
or long-run supplements to less expansive monetary
actions. The elimination of inflation requires great
patience; with ideal monetary policies it takes longei
than most of the public realizes.
Direct Controls Not Workable
in United States, -‘
Our most extensive experience with “jawboning,”
“moral suasion,” and direct controls on wages and
prices was during World War II and a short period
following the war. Beginning in early 1941, the fore-
runner to the Office of Price Administration (OPA)
issued schedules setting maximum rents and prices
on other “critical” items.’ Although these schedules
were issued on the basis of dubious legal authority,
this deficiency was remedied in early 1942 following
the United States declaration of war. Retail prices of
~Ibid., p. 10.
‘U.S. Office of Price Administration, Chronology of the Office
of Pr-ice Administration, January 1941 - November 1946, pre-
pared by Lawrence E. Tilley under the direction of Harvey
C. Mansfield, Chief, Policy Analysis Branch (Washington,
D.C.: Govermnent Printing Office, November 30, 1946).
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most items were frozen at the March 1942 level, and
mandatory price controls remained in effect for most
items until October 1946.6 However, as a result of
excessive monetary growth, demand for goods and
services grew rapidly.
During the initial period of jawboning and price
schedules (January 1941 to March 1942), the stock
of money rose at a 16 per cent annual rate and the
consumer price index at a 12 per cent annual rate.7
While mandatory controls were in effect (March 1942
to October 1946), the stock of money rose at an 18
per cent rate and consumer prices at a6per cent rate.
Such data, however, tend to underestimate the real
increase in prices since they exclude numerous black
market transactions and deterioration of quality.
The number of workers required to operate and
enforce this direct controls program was staggering.
By 1944, 325,000 price control volunteers, in addition
to 65,000 paid employees, were being utilized. This
was a period when the country was faced with a labor
shortage, and most of these people could have worked
at productive jobs, thereby contributing to an increase
in total output and a lower rate of inflation. In addi-
tion to the number of employees required directly by
OPA, the program was a burden to all business estab-
lishments. For example, the banldng system was han-
dling 5 billion ration coupons per month in 1944.
By the end of the war most Americans had become
disenchanted with rationing, price controls, empty
grocery shelves, and queuing up for purchases. After
a year of postwar domestic crises, including numerous
strikes and food shortages combined with a high rate
of inflation, direct controls were largely ended. During
the three years following the termination of controls
on most items in October 1946, money rose at less than
a one per cent rate, and consumer prices increased
at a 4 per cent rate.
We have no way of knowing how much inflation
\vould have occurred during World War II had free
market conditions prevailed, nor how stable prices
would havebeen following the war had controls con-
tinued. Generally accepted economic theory does tell
us something about such controls. If prices or wages
are arbitrarily set above equilibrium levels, sales will
decline and fewer workers will he employed. On the
other hand, if wages and prices are set below equilib-
~Ibid
T
Money stock data through 1946 from Milton Friedman and
Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United
States 1867 - 1960 (Princeton Princeton University Press,
1963), Appendix A, Table A-i; 1947-71 from Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Consumer price
data from U.S. Department of Labor.
rium levels, consumers will want to purchase more
goods and services than are available, and output
must be rationed.
- Nor in Western Europe
The foreign experience with direct controls has
been no more favorable than our own. A study for
the President’s Council of Economic Advisers of the
experience with controls in Western Europe following
World War II reports, “Holders of public office
have sought .. .to avoid the excessive exercise of pri-
vate power, not by eliminating the source of such
power but by preventing its full exploitation. This is
the essence of what has come to be known as incomes
policy.” It was concluded that none of the methods
used were very effective, and public disillusionment
was reflected in the decline or abandonment of such
controls in most of these nations by the end of the
last decade.
Typical of the experience with direct controls in
Western Europe is that of the Netherlands where
these methods received their most determined and
innovative support.’ The Dutch Government passed
a labor relations act in 1945 which provided mediators
with stringent powers to control labor markets and
wages. With the Socialists in power the incomes policy
in the early postwar period was quite effective, but
the honeymoon did not last long. The guidelines kept
all wages below equilibrium rates as intended. In
1951, with a balance of trade deficit and a high rate
of inflation, real wages actually fell, Labor shortages
developed, and considerable pressure built up for ad-
ditional labor resources, especially in the high profit
industries. The willingness of employers to grant wage
increases in excess of the legal limits began to under-
mine the guidelines. Black market wages were com-
muon, and prosecutions, fines, and even jail sentences
followed.
When union leadership agreed to a wage increase
of only 3 per cent in 1955, members began to criticize
their leaders for supporting the guidelines, an unusual
action in the Netherlands. As a result, the wage nego-
tiating agency failed to function, and the government
was forced to grant higher wages through arbitration.
In 1957, with wages rising 8 to 9 per cent per year
and a balance-of-payments crisis developing, the union
leadership again accepted a policy of extreme re-
‘Lloyd Ulman, University of California, Berkeley, and Robert
J. Flanagan, University of Chicago, “Wage Restraint: A
Study of Incomes Policies in Western Europe” (unpublished
study made possible by grant from Council of Economic
Advisers, 1971), p. i.
‘Ibid., Chapter 1.
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straint. This time, however, the leadership could not
carry the members with them. The new policy re-
quired that all wage increases in excess of 3 per cent
come out of profits, but it failed as both wages and
prices soared above guideline rates, and the balance
of payments worsened.
The Labor government \vas replaced in 1959 by a
more conservative government \vhich espoused greater
freedom in wage determination. More flexible limits
on wage settlements and increased use of collective
bargaining were permitted at the industry level. This
policy achieved more government regulation but failed
to control wages and prices. A 1961 law limited wage
increases to increases in productivity. It acknowledged
no role for interoccupational wage differences, how-
ever, and ran into difficulty almost immediately.
A new wage policy, based on the Central Planning
Bureau’s econometric model, was adopted in 1963.
The model was no more competent to establish wages
than the mediators. It implied a wage increase of 1.2
per cent, but this was arbitrarily raised to 2.7 per
cent. Pressure for higher wages developed within the
unions, and employers, short of help at the estab-
lished scale, openly announced plans to pay more.
As a result, wages and salaries rose 13 per cent in
1963, 15 per cent in 1964, and 11 per cent in 1965.
No agreements were reached in 1966 and 1967, and
by the autumn of 1967, all factions of labor refused
to participate in the policy any longer.
In response to these challenges, the Government
decided in 1969 to introduce more stringent legisla-
tion xvhieh gave it formal authority to freeze wages
after consultation with the Social and Economic Coun-
cil and the Foundation of Labor. The measure, finally
passed in 1970, was strongly opposed by the unions,
and they withdrew from the Social and Economic
Council and from central bargaining. The minister
in charge was warned that Parliament had given him
nothing but a “paper sword.”
Thus, the Sixties witnessed the collapse of an am-
bitious attempt by the Netherlands Government to
supervise a private incomes policy, and the Seventies
reveakd the failure of a policy based on compulsion.
The formal incomes policies adopted in the United
Kingdom and Denmark have likewise been less than
successful, and the more limited attempts to admin-
ister wages or prices in France, West Germany, and
Italy have generally failed. Yet, the incomes policy’s
popularity in principle has thus far proved almost as
durable as the problem which it was desi~sedto
solve.
Stable Prices Not Inconsistent with
Current Economic Structure
Despite the failures of direct controls in other coun-
tries, the arguments for their use in the United States
continue. Such arguments are generally based on the
belief that a largeportion of the labor and commodity
markets is comprised of noncompetitive elements and
that prices of goods and services sold in such markets
are not sensitive to a reduction in demand. Most ana-
lysts admit that demand for goods and services can be
increased by public policies. Nevertheless, some con-
tend that after periods of excessive demand, the non-
competitive elements in labor and business can con-
tinue to push prices upward despite less expansive
monetary policies.
It is my view that in the absence of excessive
demand average prices cannot be pushed up signif-
icantly, even by noncompetitive elements. The price
lag relative to declining demand probably reflects
imperfect information in forming price expectations
rather than monopolistic power. Current wage settle-
ments are being made on the basis of recent price
trends rather than on conditions likely to prevail
during the period covered by the agreements.
When the rate of monetary growth is reduced,
consumers and business firms find themselves with
less money than anticipated. They reduce their rate
of spending in an attempt to maintain cash balances.
Some producers will find themselves with excessive
inventories. They may first attempt to cut costs by
reducing hours worked or overtime. Then, if the price
incentive is not sufficient to maintain current output
at current wage rates, producers will lay off workers
or reduce their work force through attrition until out-
put clears the muarket at a profitable price. Most
workers who are unemployed because of excessive
wage settlements will eventually find acceptable jobs.
Thus, the restricted output and increased prices in
specific sectors resulting from noneompetitive ele-
ments are partially offset by increased output and
lower prices elsewhere.
Economy Still Subject to Competitive Forces
Even if large unions and business firms could induce
price changes, we have no evidence that they have
greater power than during the period 1953 to 1961
when the postwar inflation was slowed to a one per
cent rate, as measured by the consumer price index.
Let me quickly add that Id onot condone monopolis-
tic po\ver, either in the hands of unions or of busi-
nesses. It has without doubt caused misallocation of
resources and higher levels of unemployment, but we
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have no evidence that such power has been an im-
portant factor contributing to the current inflation.
For example, following the high rate of inflation dur-
ing World War II and the Korean War, the rate of
inflation was reduced from 1953 to 1961 with a slower
rate of monetary growth. The stock of money during
this period rose only 1.4 per cent per year and prices
only 2 per cent as measured by the GNP price de-
flator, or only 1 per cent as measured by the wholesale
and consumer price indices. This slower rate of infla-
tion was achieved despite the fact that a larger per
cent of the labor force was unionized than is the case
today. The share of nonagricultural workers in unions
declined from 34 to 28 per cent and the total labor
force in unions from 25 to 23 per cent during the
period 1953~68.b0 Such data suggest that the non-
competitive elements in the labor market have not
increased.
We likewise have no evidence of an increase in
monopoly power in commodity markets since the mid-
1950’s. The fifty largest manufacturing firms had 23
per cent of value added in 1954, 25 per cent in 1963,
and 25 per cent in 1966.” Shipments accounted for
by the largestfour firms in each of twenty-two selected
industries showed little change in concentration from
1947 to 1966. The share of the largest four firms
increased in half the industries and declined in the
other half. Furthermore, any tendency toward domes-
tic concentration has been more than offset by the
rising competition from manufacturing firms abroad.
In addition, if greater competition is desired, there
are actions which the government can appropriately
take within a free market framework to improve both
labor and commodity markets. I suggest further re-
laxation of tariffs and other import controls. The re-
sulting increase in worldwide competition would tend
to stabilize prices for all goods and services traded
in international markets. The removal of archaicbuild-
ing codes would aid the construction industry.
Action should also be taken to reduce restrictions
on entry into unions. Relatively higher pay scales for
trainees after attaining moderate skills might be help-
ful in attracting more labor into some sectors. Where
bottlenecks to entry are retained through union ac-
tion, I suggest the application of anti-trust legislation.
Minimum wage laws which restrict the employment
of students, the unskilled, and the handicapped should
lOUTS. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United Slates, 1970. For a further
discussion of this point see Alfred L. Malabre, Jr., “Troubled
Unions,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1971.
ll5tatistical Abstract, 1970.
be repealed. An incomes policy that includes only
these actions will not only improve the functioning
of the labor and product markets but will also en-
hance output of goods and services for the entire
community.
Excessive Money Growth: Cause
of Inflation
In contrast to the view that imperfect labor and
commodity markets are an important cause of infla-
tion is my belief that an excessive rate of monetary
growth is the chief culprit. All substantial and pro-
longed general price increases throughout history have
been associated with a rapid increase in the stock
of money per capita. Following successive debase-
inents, the precious metal content of the Roman coin
had been reduced until it was almost worthless in the
early 300’s. Prices had increased four to eight times
their former level. Through price and wage edicts,
an incomes policy was established which quickly failed
because people began to make most payments, in-
cluding taxes, with commodities or other nonmoney
assets.’2
A similar debasement followed by a rapid rise in
prices occurred in England under Henry VIII in the
early 1500’s.’3 Landowners who had long-term crop-
share leases maintained their living conditions of prior
years. Many, however, had long-term fixed payment
leases, and their real rental returns were reduced
while their tenants received a windfall.
A hyper-inflation in Germany following World
War I can be traced to monetary growth. From July
1922 to June 1923, the quantity of money rose 86-fold,
and the cost of living (food) rose 137-fold. By June
1923, German money was worth less than one per cent
its value a year earlier.’4
Our experience with excessive money growth and
inflation has been consistent with the experience else-
where. Many of you are doubtless familiar with the
excessive money creation and the consequent inflation
in the Confederate States during the Civil War. By
January 1864 the stock of currency in circulation had
increased about elevenfold, and prices had increased
faster as a result of declining output of goods and
‘
2
Paul-Louis, Ancient Rome at Work (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1927), pp. 313-315.
T3
William Cunaingham, The Growth of English Industry and
Commerce During the Early and Middle Ages, 5th ed.
(Cambridge: At the University Press, 1910-27), p. 543.
‘
4
Constantino Breseiath-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation;
A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany
1914-1923, translated by Millicent E. Sayers (New York:
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1937), p. 35.
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services.’~One contemporary reporter observed, “Be-
fore the war I went to market with the money in my
pocket and brought back my purchases in a basket;
now I take the money in the basket and bring the
things home in my pocket.”6
Our more recent inflations, although on a much
smaller scale than these hyper-inflations, can be traced
to the same causal forces. For example, from 1915 to
1920 the stock of money rose at the annual rate of 14
per cent and wholesale prices 17 per cent. From 1938
to 1948 the stock of money rose at a 14 per cent rate
and wholesale prices at a 7 per cent rate, despite the
sharp increase of resource utilization during the pe-
riod.’7 In the recent inflation from 1965 to 1970 the
stock of money grew at a 5 per cent rate, wholesale
pricesat a 3 per cent rate, and the general price index
at a 4 per cent rate. The leveling off or a prolonged
decline in the stock of money likewise is associated
with a leveling off or decline in prices. For example,
in 1920 and early 1921 both the stock of money and
prices declined, a pattern which was repeated in the
period l929-33,’~The decline in the stock of money
in this latter period was sufficiently prolonged and
intense to cause a major depression.
Slower Money Growth the Solution
The solution to inflation is the elimination of its
cause. Actions were taken in early 1969 to slow the
rate of money growth. The stock of money rose only
about 3 per cent during the year, down from an 8
per cent rate in the previous two years. In response
to slower money growth, spending on goods and
services began to moderate late in the year. Such
spending rose at a 4 per cent annual rate from the
third quarter of 1969 to the end of 1970, following
an 8 per cent rate of advance in the previous five
quarters. Consistent with past experience, however,
the momentum of the inflation continued following the
reduced rate of spending growth.
By mid-1970 the rate of inflation began to decline.
Since last June consumer prices have risen at the
annual rate of 4 per cent, compared with a 6 per cent
rate in the previous year. While the rate of inflation
was slowing, the nation was paying for the previous
excesses, Unemployment svas rising, and real product
was down. The immediate impact of a change in
‘
tm
Margaret C. Myers, A Financial History of the United
States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 169.
‘
6
llarold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History,
7th ed. (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 357.
mrFriedman mmd Schwartz, Monetary History; Board of
Covernors; Departraent of Labor.
msFried,nan and Schwartz, Monetary History, Chart 62.
monetary growth was on spending and output, but
there was a lagged effect on prices.
Early last year monetary policies were relaxed
as a consequence of the decline in output and higher
unemployment. During the year the stock of money
rose 5 per cent, but the recovery of spending and
production may have been delayed a few months by
the automobile strike last fall. Early this year the
growth rate of money again accelerated. In the last
three months it has risen at a 13 per cent annual rate
the highest rate of any three-month period since
1950. Recovery is now underway. Retail sales have
risen markedly, housing starts have increased, and
industrial production is up. Again an early impact of
monetary growth on economic activity is observed,
while prices are affected only in the longer run.
Expectations Have Exceeded Possibilities
The relatively long lag between monetary actions
and their impact on prices has probably been the
major disappointment with the progress made in slow-
ing the rate of inflation to date. Most people fail to
recognize the length of time required for monetary
actions to have a significant impact on average prices.
Monetary restraint first induces a slower rate of growth
in cash balances relative to money demand. Indi-
viduals and firms reduce their rate of spending in an
attempt to build up cash balances to desired levels.
This reduction in spending growth reduces nominal
GNP growth and the growth rate of overall demand
for goods and services. Expectations based on past
trends in prices and wages, however, continue to pro-
vide inflationary momentum until offset by basic sup-
ply and demand conditions. The lag between appro-
priate monetary actions and the achievement of
relatively stable prices may thus be expected to ex-
tend over a period of three or four years, following a
prolonged and relatively high rate of monetary ex-
pansion, as in 1967 and 1968.
The slowdown is aggravated by imperfect function-
ing of labor markets as reflected by a relatively high
unemployment rate. In addition to higher unemploy-
ment in the civilian sector, unemployment has been
aggravated by a sharp decrease in some types of de-
fense expenditures. Aircraft manufacturers on the
West Coast have made sharp cutbacks.
In some occupations unemployment was further in-
creased by the sufficiently strong bargaining power of
unions. Excessive wage rate settlements relative to
supply and demand conditions tend to reduce the
number employed.
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It takes time for the laid-off workers and the new
entrants into the labor market to find jobs. Time is
also required for business firms to adjust to a change
in demand. During this adjustment period the nation’s
resources are underutilized, and production of goods
and services is well below potential levels. This is
the price we pay for reducing inflation. It is a cost
which we must accept, and it cannot be legislated
into nonexistence through the provision for nonwork-
able controls on our economnic system.
Conclusion
In summation, direct controls on wages and prices
have been tried both here and abroad and found
unworkable. They may suppress the rate of inflation
for a short period under favorable conditions, but the
inflationary pressures soon build up, and the controls
are usually abandoned. Furthermore, all attempts to
control inflation by such methods have led to a reduc-
tion in economic efficiency and a breakdown of re-
spect for the law.
The argument that inflation can no longer be mod-
erated by monetary actions is not valid. Non-com-
petitive elements in the labor and commodity markets
were probably stronger in the early l950’s, when a
similar inflation was slowed.
Excessive money growth is the cause of inflation,
and a slower rate of money growth is the solution to
the problem. Money has an early impact on spending
and production, but a longer period is required to
Stabilization can be attained at higher levels of
employment and output if we adopt policies to elfini-
nate sharp changes in the rate of monetary growth and
reduce barriers to a more rapid adjustment to market
forces, The stop-and-go method of monetary actions in
recent years tends to reduce both output and
employment.
Expectations of future price trends must be changed
before reduced demand growth can have a major
impact on prices. This changed outlook, first evident
about mid-1970, has caused the momentum of the
current inflation to slacken. Ia mvitally concerned,
however, about the rapid rate of nioney growth in
recent months. There is great danger of reltindling
the flames of inflation.
Furthermore, if we attempt to halt the inflation
through direct controls, I fear that we will not exer-
cise the necessary monetary restraint and will lose
much of the gain achieved from the slower rate of
money growth in 1969. In addition, such controls will
mean further losses of freedom for individual action
which has through the years provided us \vith the
world’s most efficient economy.
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slow an inflation. The length of this period has been
misjudged by many people ‘who have concluded on
the basis of recent experience that monetary actions
arc mneffectmmc If we excrcmse the patience to wait
for the economy to adjust to a slower rate of demand
growth and maintain appropriate monetary policies,
I am sure that we can again stabilize prices at a
relatively low rate of unemployment.
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